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The Impact of Institutional Arrangements on Educational Efficiency
Trevor C. Collier*
Department of Economics and Finance, University of Dayton, 300 College Park, Dayton, OH, 45469, USA
Abstract: Per pupil expenditures on education in the United States have grown immensely in recent decades, yet student
achievement has been stagnant. An abundance of research has sought to solve this enigma, much of it centered on the
incentive structure facing administrators. Some recent papers use TIMSS data to analyze the relationship between
institutional arrangements—that typically do not vary within a single country—and student achievement. Similarly, we
utilize TIMSS 1999 to determine if there is an indirect relationship between institutional arrangements and student
achievement, via a relationship with school efficiency. Our results show that the specified link between institutional
arrangements and student achievement (direct or indirect) is important in certain instances and confirm evidence found in
previous research that certain arrangements are beneficial or detrimental to student achievement, regardless of the
specification chosen.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Real per pupil expenditures in the U.S. increased from
$2,670 in the 1960-1961 school-year to $9,266 in the 20042005 school-year (figures are in constant 2006-2007 U.S.
dollars), while pupil-teacher ratios fell from 27.4 in 1960 to
15.4 in 2005 [1]. Obviously policymakers in this country
believe that increased educational funding will lead to
increased school quality (student achievement). Alas, student
achievement has not shown any improvement over the past
several decades [2, 3]. Research on the impact of so-called
school inputs (i.e. teacher education, teacher salaries, etc.)
has resulted in scant evidence of a link between these inputs
and student achievement. Hanushek [4] sums up this
literature by saying, “A wide range of analyses indicate that
overall resource policies have not led to discernible
improvements in student performance.”
In response to the lack of a significant relationship
between school resources and student performance, many
researchers have directed their attention toward the
incentives faced by school teachers and administrators. A
common conclusion is that schools are plagued by
inefficiency, and that inefficiency will persist until the
incentive structure is altered [4-6]. Studies analyzing
inefficiency in public schools have been able to locate the
missing relationship between school resources and student
performance [7, 8]. Additionally, Collier and Millimet [9]
find some evidence to support the notion that increased
competition leads to increased efficiency in public schools,
but only in districts that operate in financially flexible
environments. Duncombe et al. [10] use Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA) and report lower levels of cost efficiency in
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districts facing greater competition as measured by private
school enrollment.
The large majority of the research on education focuses
on data collected within the United States. There are plenty
of exceptions to this rule [11, 12]; however, even less research
has included data collected from multiple countries. A
number of recent papers have used the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), an international project that collects data every four years on: student
achievement scores, family background, class, school, and
country characteristics [3, 9, 13-15].
Woessman [15], in a seminal paper using data from
TIMSS 1995, finds that the following institutional
characteristics have significant positive impacts on student
achievement: central examinations, centralized control
mechanisms in curricular and budgetary affairs, school
autonomy in process and personnel decisions, individual
teachers having both incentives and powers to select
appropriate teaching methods, limited influence of teachers'
unions, scrutiny of students' educational performance,
encouragement of parents to take interest in teaching matters,
and intermediate level of administration performing
administrative tasks and educational funding, and
competition from privately managed schools. His research
shows that a combination of all positive influencing
institutional arrangements leads to a test-score increase of
almost two standard deviations (ceteris paribus) over the
least conducive arrangement.
Similarly, Collier and Millimet [9] take a distributional
approach, testing the institutional arrangements using
quantile treatment effects, and find that many of the
conditional mean results in Woessman [15] do not hold for
the entire distribution of student test scores.
The drawback to Collier and Millimet [9] and Woessman
[15] is that they allow only for a direct relationship between
the institutional characteristics and student test scores. From
2012 Bentham Open
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a theoretical standpoint, it is more likely that the institutional
arrangements have an indirect relationship with student
achievement. Following this same logic, Dustmann et al.
[16] analyzed the impact of class size in secondary school on
earnings later in life using data from England. While
previous studies have failed to uncover any relationship
between measures of school quality and subsequent labor
market outcomes, the authors did find a positive impact by
specifying the exact linkage. Specifically, the authors
hypothesized that secondary school class size affects the
probability of attending college and college attendance
affects subsequent earnings. The data supported the
hypothesis. Thus, the authors were able to establish a
relationship between secondary school quality and earnings
through the utilization of a two-step modeling approach.
This paper adds to the literature in two ways: (i) provides
another analysis using cross-country data and (ii) analyzes
the way in which institutional factors enter the educational
production function (i.e. directly or indirectly via an
association with efficiency). This relationship will be tested
by estimating efficiency at the school level; and then
estimating the relationship, if any, of the institutional
arrangements with this efficiency. These results are
compared to the results using a standard ordinary least
squares model (OLS) with the institutional arrangements
included as regressors.
Many of the institutional arrangements tested here are
found to have different coefficient estimates across the two
models utilized. However, in none of these instances do the
signs of the coefficients differ and hold statistical
significance. The differences that do exist could be an
indication that the true relationship between these
institutional arrangements and student achievement is
actually an indirect one; via a relationship with school
efficiency. These differences could also result simply from a
mis-specification of either model. Further research is needed
to confirm the appropriate relationship.
This paper does confirm the results of some of the
previous research on institutional arrangements in education.
Consistent with Collier and Millimet [9] and Woessman
[15], we find that school autonomy in purchasing supplies
has a positive relationship with student achievement and
efficiency, and that teachers' unions having a large influence
on curriculum is associated with lower levels of student
achievement and school efficiency [9, 15].
The remainder of this paper is organized as the
following. Section 2 describes the estimation techniques
used herein. Section 3 gives an overview of the data. Section
4 discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.
2. METHODOLOGY
A two-stage model will be used to test whether the
institutional arrangements discussed in this paper have any
association with efficiency in schools. The first-stage entails
estimation of school level efficiency; the second-stage
analyzes
the
relationships
between
institutional
characteristics and efficiency. Each stage is discussed in
turn.
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2.1. Efficiency Estimation
The panel data production function estimator of Schmidt
and Sickles [17] is used to estimate the school level
efficiency. The panel data production function estimator is
very appealing, given that it reduces to the standard fixed
effects linear regression model. Alternative approaches exist,
including nonparametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
and maximum likelihood stochastic frontier models. DEA
models are criticized for their inability to account for
stochastic error. Maximum likelihood models assume a
parametric distribution for the inefficiency term (usually
half-normal or exponential), and require the inefficiency to
be independent across observations, as well as uncorrelated
with the choice of inputs. Monte Carlo simulations have
shown the maximum likelihood models to be outperformed
by both DEA and the panel data production function
estimator. Additionally, the assumption of an inefficiency
term that is uncorrelated with the choice of inputs could be
problematic in answering the research question of this paper.
The production function for student achievement can be
written as
yisk =  + xisk  – usk + isk

(1)

where yisk is a measure of student achievement for student i
in school s in country k, xisk is a vector of inputs, usk is the
level of technical inefficiency in school s in country k, and
isk represents purely idiosyncratic shocks which are
uncorrelated with the choice of inputs. Consistent with the
interpretation of u as an inefficiency term, it is assumed that
usk >0 for all s, k.
Grouping the intercept and the technical inefficiency
term, equation (1) may be re-written as
yisk = ( – usk) + xisk  + isk
=  sk + xisk  + isk

(2)

Given the above assumption concerning the error term, ,
equation (2) may be estimated using the standard fixed
effects (`within') estimator. Estimates of usk that are strictly
non-negative are then given by the deviation between each
school-specific intercept and the maximum intercept:






u sk = max{ sk }   sk  0

(3)

s

By construction, the most efficient class is deemed
completely efficient. The technical efficiency measure used
in the second-stage analysis (discussed in the next section) is




defined as tesk = exp( u sk ) , which is bound by zero and


unity. As shown in Schmidt and Sickles [17], tesk provides a
consistent estimate of tesk as N,T . In the present context
N refers to the number of schools, and T refers to the number
of students in each school.
Two potential drawbacks to the Schmidt and Sickles [17]
approach have been documented in the literature, and are
worth mentioning. First, technical inefficiency, u, is assumed
to be invariant across students in the same school. Second,
all heterogeneity across observations is counted as
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inefficiency. In other words, excluding the inefficiency term
in equation (1) there is no other source of individual
heterogeneity. The former is not problematic in the present
context; it would make little sense for a school to have
differing efficiency levels across its students. However, the
latter drawback is somewhat problematic in this instance,
because of the limited number of variables that vary within a
school.
2.2. Determinants of Efficiency
The second-stage estimation of the determinants of
efficiency uses a standard ordinary least squares approach.
The technical efficiency estimated in the first stage is now
regressed on different institutional arrangements to find their
association, if any, with efficiency. The estimated equation
for school-level efficiency is


_

tesk =  + zsk +  sk

(4)



where tesk is the technical efficiency measure from the first
_

stage at the school-level, zsk is a vector of institutional
arrangements at the school-level,  is the parameter of
interest, as it represents the slope estimates on the
institutional arrangements, and sk represents measurement
error due to the need to estimate technical efficiency.
Although the efficiency estimates are regressed on an
extensive set of institutional arrangements, it is possible that
there are other unobservables that affect efficiency. Due to a
lack of sufficient instrumental variables, this problem is
unavoidable in the present context. As a result, these
findings may only be identifying correlations and not causal
relationships; nonetheless, the results are important for
comparison to Woessman [15].
2.3. Ordinary Least Squares
Finally, we also estimate a standard educational
production function using an ordinary least squares model
(OLS) with the institutional arrangements included as
regressors. This model can be written as:
yisk =  + xisk  + zsk + isk

(5)

where yisk is a measure of student achievement for student i
in school s in country k, xisk is a vector of inputs, zsk is a
vector of institutional arrangements in school s in country k,
and isk represents purely idiosyncratic shocks which are
uncorrelated with the choice of inputs.
3. DATA
The data are obtained from the 1999 Trends in
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS)1.
TIMSS 1999 contains student, teacher and school
background information across 38 different countries. The
database includes responses of students, teachers and school
principals on background questionnaires, as well as student
achievement scores on internationally comparable math and
science exams. The TIMSS 1999 dataset targeted “students
1

The TIMSS 2003 dataset has been released as well; however, it does not
include all of the institutional variables used herein.

3

enrolled in the upper of the two adjacent grades that contain
the largest proportion of 13-year olds at the time of testing"
[18]. The student background questionnaires contain
information on family background (such as parents' levels of
education,
and
household
composition),
student
demographics, and classroom activities. The teacher
background questionnaire provides information on the
teacher (such as age, gender, experience and education), the
class (such as its size), the teacher's responsibilities (such as
purchasing supplies and hiring teachers), and the availability
of materials. The principal background questionnaire
includes information on the school's characteristics, its
degree of centralization in decision-making, and its
distribution of responsibilities for a number of tasks.
Many of the questionnaire responses were transformed
into categorical variables for the analysis. Further, the
original database includes a number of students, teachers and
principals that are missing responses, either because they
failed to answer the questions, or because they were not
administered the questions. This missing data would severely
diminish the size of the data set, so the procedure detailed in
Woessman [15] is followed to impute missing variables in
the TIMSS 1999 data. Finally, we incorporate additional
information from the World Education Indicators (WEI)
1999 a dataset collected jointly by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the
UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) on per capita gross
domestic product (GDP) and educational expenditures per
student in each country.2 Data on GDP per capita and
educational expenditures per student were not available for
every country, so we are left with 28 countries and a total
pool of over 120,000 individual students. From this full
sample, we also estimate comparisons with sub-samples of
countries that (i) are members of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and (ii)
have curriculum-based external exit exams (CBEEEs).
Our measures of student achievement come from the
mathematics and science scores of students who were
administered proficiency tests as a part of the TIMSS survey.
The tests were a combination of multiple choice and open
response questions, where a considerable degree of care was
placed on making the tests internationally comparable across
languages and cultures.3
An extensive set of individual, class, and teacher
characteristics available from the TIMSS data are used to
obtain the technical efficiency measures. Specifically, the
vector x in (1) includes the following (in addition to a
constant term):
Individual: age, a gender dummy, and a dummy for
whether the student was born in the country of current
residence;

2

Some countries did not have GDP per capita and expenditure per student
data available in the given year (1999), so it was supplemented, if available,
by the previous year (1998).
3
To limit the demands placed on test takers, each student was given only a
subset of the full test. Item response theory methods were then utilized to
insure the comparability of students taking different subsets [27].
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Family: two dummies for the highest level of education
of the student's parents (at least a secondary education and at
least a university education, versus not having a secondary
education), a dummy for whether both parents were born in
the country, four dummies for the number of books in the
student's home (1-10 books, 11-25 books, 26-100 books, and
101-200 books, versus having more than 200 books), and a
dummy for whether the student resides with both parents;
Class: class size;
Teacher: age, a gender dummy, years of teaching
experience, three dummies indicating the highest level of
education (a secondary degree, a bachelor's degree, and a
master's degree or higher, versus not having a secondary
degree);
Additionally, institutional characteristics from the
TIMSS data and country specific variables from WEI are
used in the second-stage analysis. Specifically, the vector
_

z in equation (4) includes the following:
Country Specifics: GDP per capita, and the level of
education expenditures per student.
Influences on Curriculum: dummies indicating how
much influence the following items have on the curriculum:
external exams, individual teachers, subject teachers as a
group, all teachers collectively, and teachers' unions;
Distribution of Responsibility: dummies indicating
whether teachers, school administrators, or individuals
outside of the school are responsible for the following duties:
hiring teachers, deciding the school budget, purchasing
supplies, and determining teacher salaries.
Teacher Influence: dummies indicating whether or not
the teacher exerts a large influence on the following: the
amount of money to be spent on supplies, what supplies are
purchased, the subject matter taught, and the textbook
chosen for the class.
4. RESULTS
We estimate both Cobb-Douglas and translog production
functions. The F-test of the joint significance of the
interaction terms in the translog model rejects the restrictions
imposed in the Cobb-Douglas form at the p<0.05 confidence
level. Despite this, the results are similar to those in the
translog models and are not discussed here for the sake of
brevity, but are available from the author upon request. The
first-stage translog production function estimates are shown
in Table 1. The table includes four estimates; one each for
math and science scores using the OLS model of equation
(5) and one each for math and science scores using the fixed
effects model shown in equation (1). There are 170
interaction terms used in the translog model, but these are
suppressed in the tables. They are available from the author
upon request. The first-stage results are not the main focus of
this paper; however, it is important to note that the only
variable that is significant in the fixed effects model for both
math and science is the student’s age. This is obviously
specific to the student, and thus outside the control of school
administrators. This finding is consistent which Hanushek's
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review of the education literature, which concludes that
observable school inputs do not matter.
The focus of this paper is to compare the results of
allowing institutional arrangements to impact educational
achievement directly with the results of forcing the
institutional arrangements to impact education achievement
indirectly through a relationship with school-level efficiency.
Thus, although the OLS model includes all the inputs of the
fixed effects model, plus the institutional arrangements, we
break up the results of the OLS model into two tables. Table
1, as discussed above, includes the same inputs included in
the fixed effects model. Table 2 includes the coefficient
estimated on the institutional arrangements from the OLS
model and the coefficient estimated on the institutional
arrangements from the regression on school-level efficiency
(equation (4)).
As you can see from Table 2, the sign of the coefficient
estimates are the same across the two models for all of the
institutional variables, except for teachers being held
responsible for deciding the school budget in science. The
level of statistical significance of the estimates does vary
some across the two models; however, it is not clear which
specification is more accurate.
4.1. Baseline Results
4.1.1. Distribution of Responsibility
The responsibility for certain actions is divided between
the schools being held responsible, the teachers being held
responsible, or someone outside of the school holding the
responsibility. The models analyzed here include dummy
variables indicating that schools are responsible or teachers
are responsible. Consonant with the literature, it is
hypothesized that decentralization of decision-making
authority leads to gains in efficiency in educational
production if schools and teachers can make more informed
decisions due to community specific information [19, 20].
Responsibility for Hiring Teachers
The school dummy has a positive coefficient for hiring
teachers in both math and science and in both the direct OLS
and indirect efficiency models. However, these coefficient
estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level in both
math and science fixed effects models, whereas they are
statistically insignificant in both math and science OLS
models. The coefficients on the dummy for teachers holding
this responsibility are negative, but not statistically
significant in any of the subject and model combinations.
These results suggest that giving schools the responsibility
for hiring teachers is associated with higher levels of
efficiency, as compared with the responsibility lying with
teachers or someone outside of the school. This result is
similar to the finding in Woessman [15] that students in
schools who are given the autonomy over hiring decisions
score significantly higher on math and science tests. Vegas
[21] finds that decentralization of decision-making authority
has a positive impact on student achievement. This would
coincide with schools and/or teachers having responsibility
for hiring teachers (and the other responsibilities discussed in
this paper) as opposed to someone outside of the school
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Translog Fixed Effects and OLS Production Function Estimates at the School Level with the Full Sample
Math

Independent
Variable

Science

OLS

Fixed Effects

OLS

Fixed Effects

Coeff

Std Error

Coeff

Std Error

Coeff

Std Error

Coeff

Std Error

Student's Age

22.139‡

2.677

7.602‡

0.903

20.671‡

2.585

5.843‡

0.979

Class Size

-1.075‡

0.251

-0.249

0.177

-1.077‡

0.309

-0.081

0.173

Teacher's Experience

-0.168

0.204

0.187

0.147

-0.070

0.188

-0.005

0.117

Student's Sex

-0.443‡

0.137

0.125

0.083

-0.257*

0.145

0.182*

0.102

Born in Country

-0.624†

0.273

0.213

0.179

-0.867‡

0.313

-0.204

0.225

Live with both Parents

-1.012‡

0.164

0.080

0.112

-0.819‡

0.180

-0.054

0.141

Both Parents born in Country

-1.074‡

0.285

-0.293*

0.170

-0.817‡

0.299

-0.122

0.207

0.288

0.362

0.510*

0.301

-0.122

0.385

-0.140

0.348

Parents' Education 2 (Secondary)

-0.642‡

0.190

-0.178

0.122

-0.254

0.189

0.208

0.148

Parents' Education 3 (Master’s)

0.073†

0.030

0.012

0.019

0.051

0.032

0.006

0.023

Books in Home (1-10)

-0.264

0.196

0.137

0.141

-0.415*

0.235

-0.099

0.195

Books in Home (11-25)

-0.890‡

0.177

-0.325‡

0.123

-0.593‡

0.192

-0.186

0.148

Books in Home (26-100)

-0.292

0.188

-0.076

0.115

-0.180

0.185

-0.020

0.121

Books in Home (101-200)

-0.191

0.199

-0.060

0.117

-0.140

0.196

-0.093

0.123

Teacher's Sex

0.130

0.204

0.367†

0.145

-0.026

0.197

0.157

0.119

Teacher's Age 1

0.376†

0.164

-0.083

0.111

0.259*

0.147

0.063

0.092

Teacher's Age 2

0.357†

0.162

-0.071

0.113

0.241*

0.145

0.067

0.091

Teacher's Age 3

0.285*

0.163

-0.079

0.115

0.221

0.145

0.074

0.091

Teacher's Age 4

0.307*

0.164

-0.098

0.118

0.200

0.145

0.071

0.091

Teacher's Age 5

0.343†

0.165

-0.124

0.123

0.229

0.148

0.052

0.092

Teacher's Education (Bachelor's)

-0.324

0.614

0.851†

0.380

-1.884†

0.741

0.126

0.451

Teacher's Education (Master's)

0.192

0.236

0.091

0.139

0.087

0.246

-0.137

0.146

Parents' Education (University)

Note: Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level. ‡ means significant at the 1% level; † means significant at the 5% level; * means significant at the 10% level. OLS
regression also includes all institutional arrangements and per capita GDP and expenditure per student.

holding the responsibility. The coefficient on the school
dummy for hiring teachers in the fixed effects models ranges
in size from 0.0121 to 0.0174, meaning that schools that
have autonomy in hiring teachers are 1.21 to 1.74 percent
more efficient than schools without this autonomy.
Responsibility for Deciding School Budget
The school dummy for deciding the school budget has
positive coefficients in math and science in both models;
however, they are only statistically significant in the OLS
models. The teacher dummy for deciding the school budget
has positive coefficients in math and science using OLS and
in math using the fixed effects model, but the coefficient in
science using the fixed effect model is negative. Only the
result in math using OLS is statistically significant (at the
5% level).
The results in Woessman [15] are consistent with the
hypothesis formed in Bishop and Woessman [19] and Fuchs
and Woessman [20], that decentralization in decisionmaking increases educational efficiency; although, the
findings presented here suggest that decentralization to the
teacher level may have limited benefits in science.

Responsibility for Purchasing Supplies
The coefficients on the school and teacher dummies for
purchasing supplies are positive and statistically significant
in both subjects using both models. Additionally, the sizes of
the coefficients on the teacher dummies are also larger than
those on the school dummies. This result shows that schools
in which teachers have autonomy in purchasing supplies are
4.76 to 7.09 percent more efficient than schools without this
autonomy.
Responsibility for Teacher Salaries
The coefficients on the school dummy for deciding
teacher salaries have positive signs in all four of the
specifications, with three of them having statistical
significance (all but the coefficient estimate in science using
OLS). The coefficients on the teacher dummy are negative
in both subjects using both models. This suggests that
schools holding the responsibility over determining teacher
salaries are more efficient than schools in which this
responsibility is held by persons outside of the school, or by
teachers themselves. This finding is similar to the result in
Woessman [15] that students in schools with autonomy over
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The Determinants of Efficiency at the School Level (Translog Model) Using OLS and Fixed Effects with the Full Sample
Math

Independent
Variable

Science

OLS

Fixed Effects

OLS

Fixed Effects

Coeff

Std Error

Coeff

Std Error

Coeff

Std Error

Coeff

Std Error

Schools

0.001

0.007

0.012‡

0.004

0.001

0.007

0.017‡

0.004

Teachers

-0.053

0.040

-0.023

0.031

-0.047

0.059

-0.027

0.051

Schools

0.022†

0.009

3.19E-04

0.005

0.026‡

0.009

0.001

0.006

Teachers

0.049†

0.025

0.005

0.019

0.017

0.022

-0.022

0.019

Schools

0.051‡

0.013

0.042‡

0.009

0.062‡

0.016

0.054‡

0.010

Teachers

0.062‡

0.014

0.048‡

0.010

0.083‡

0.017

0.071‡

0.011

Schools

0.009*

0.005

0.012‡

0.003

0.006

0.005

0.014‡

0.004

Teachers

-0.014

0.032

-0.016

0.023

-0.013

0.029

-0.010

0.025

External Exams

-0.012*

0.006

-0.009†

0.004

-0.001

0.006

-0.006

0.004

Teachers Individually

0.012†

0.006

0.007*

0.004

0.011†

0.005

0.003

0.004

Subject Teachers

0.017‡

0.006

0.012‡

0.004

0.021‡

0.006

0.020‡

0.004

Teachers Collectively

-0.009

0.006

-0.006

0.004

-0.009

0.005

-0.004

0.004

Teachers' Unions

-0.056†

0.028

-0.046†

0.020

-0.082‡

0.031

-0.073‡

0.023

-0.015

0.012

-0.021†

0.008

-0.009

0.010

-0.014*

0.008

Kind of Supplies

0.028‡

0.007

0.019‡

0.005

0.014†

0.006

0.018‡

0.005

Subject Matter

-0.019‡

0.005

-0.015‡

0.004

-0.014‡

0.005

-0.015‡

0.004

0.004

0.006

0.006

0.004

0.000

0.005

0.005

0.005

GDP per capita

-3.18E-06‡

7.30E-07

-8.99E-07‡

4.60E-07

3.74E-07

8.09E-07

-1.01E-07

5.22E-07

Expenditure per student

2.52E-05‡

2.54E-06

9.70E-05‡

1.59E-06

7.93E-06‡

2.73E-06

7.09E-06‡

1.72E-06

Responsible for:
Hiring Teachers

Deciding School Budget

Purchasing Supplies

Determining Teacher's Salaries

Influences Curriculum

Teachers have a large Influence on:
Money for Supplies

Textbook

Note: Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level. ‡ means significant at the 1% level; † means significant at the 5% level; * means significant at the 10% level. OLS
regressions also included the background variables in Table 1.

teacher salaries score higher on math and science test scores.
Additionally, this is also consistent with the hypothesis
formed in Bishop and Woessman [19] and Fuchs and
Woessman [20], that decentralization in decision-making
increases educational efficiency. Although, in this instance it
appears that decentralization to the school level is beneficial,
decentralization to the teacher level may be detrimental. The
positive and significant coefficients on the school dummy for
determining teacher salaries means that schools that have
autonomy in hiring teachers are 1.16 to 1.42 percent more
efficient than schools without this autonomy.
Policy Implications: someone within the schools should
hold the responsibility for purchasing supplies.

4.1.2. Influences on Curriculum
The following variables are known to either have a large
effect on curriculum or to have no effect on the curriculum.
The models analyzed here include a dummy variable
indicating that the variable in question has a large influence
on the curriculum.
External Exams
The coefficient on external exams is negative in all four
of the specifications, but these estimates are only statistically
significant in math. This suggests that allowing external
exams to influence a school's curriculum is negatively
associated with efficiency. It has been previously
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hypothesized that external exams provide an incentive for
teachers to work harder and thus lead to higher student
achievement; this hypothesis was shown to be true in Bishop
[22]. Additionally, Woessman [23] finds that students in
countries with central exit exams score significantly higher
on international achievement tests than students in countries
without central exit exams. However, it may be that external
exams force teachers to “teach to the test,” limiting the
amount of time spent on other important areas (which may
have been covered on the TIMSS exam), leading to the
negative relationship found here and in Woessman [15]. The
negative and significant coefficients on the dummy for
external exams in math using the fixed effect model tells us
that schools with influential external exams are 0.929
percent less efficient than schools without influential
external exams.
Teachers Individually
The dummy variable indicating that teachers individually
have a large influence on curriculum has a positive
coefficient in all four models; however, it is not statistically
significant in science using the fixed effects model. The
suggestion here is that allowing teachers to have an
individual influence on the curriculum is associated with
higher levels of efficiency. Similarly, Woessman [15] found
that students in schools where teachers individually had a
large influence on curriculum score higher in math and
science tests. Vegas [21] also found student achievement to
be positively influenced by greater teacher autonomy, but
only when the decision-making authority is decentralized.
The fixed effects result in math means that schools where
teachers individually have a large influence on curriculum
are 0.707 percent more efficient than schools where teachers
individually have no influence over curriculum.
Subject Teachers
The coefficients on subject teachers are positive and
statistically significant in both subjects using both models.
This is contrary to Woessman’s [15] finding of a significant
negative relationship between subject teachers influencing
curriculum and student achievement. This change from
Woessman [15] could be due to the fact that we do not have
all of the same variables (e.g. private school enrollment) or it
could simply be a result of using two different years of data.
Teachers Collectively
The coefficients on the dummy for teachers collectively
are negative, but statistically insignificant in both subjects
using both models. These coefficients are of the sign as those
found in Woessman [15], but his were also found to be
statistically significant.
Teachers’ Unions
The coefficient on teachers' unions is negative and
statistically significant in all four models. This finding is
analogous to the finding in Woessman [15] that allowing
teachers' unions to have a large influence on curriculum is
damaging to student achievement. Similarly, Hoxby [24]
finds that teachers' unions increase the level of educational
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inputs, but decrease productivity so much that the net effect
on student achievement is negative. The fixed effect results
mean that schools where teachers' unions have a large
influence on curriculum are 4.6 to 7.28 percent less efficient
than schools where teachers' unions have no influence over
curriculum. The coefficient estimate in science is larger than
the estimates of any of the other institutional arrangements
and the estimate in math is surpassed in magnitude by only
the coefficient on teachers holding the responsibility for
purchasing supplies. Thus, teachers' unions have a very
strong relationship with school efficiency, relative to the
other institutional factors.
Policy Implications: subject teachers (as a collective)
should hold a strong influence over the curriculum, while
teachers’ unions should not have a strong influence over the
curriculum.
4.1.3. Teacher Influence
Teachers are known to either have a large influence or no
influence on the following choices. The models analyzed
here include a dummy variable indicating that teachers have
a large influence on the choice in question.
Money for Supplies
The coefficients on the dummy variable indicating that
class teachers have a large influence on money for supplies
are negative in both subjects and both models, but the
coefficients are statistically significant only using the fixed
effects model. This is in contrast to the positive and
statistically significant effect of teachers influencing money
for supplies on tests in science found in Woessman [15].
Kind of Supplies
The dummy variable for teachers holding a large
influence on the kind of supplies has positive and
statistically significant coefficients in both subjects using
both models. These results suggest a positive relationship
between teachers influencing the kind of supplies and the
efficiency of the school, which is consistent with the benefits
to decentralization found in Vegas [21]. The findings in
Woessman [15] show a positive relationship between
teachers influencing the kind of supplies and student test
scores, but only in science. Our results suggest that the
relationship between teachers influencing the kind of
supplies and school efficiency is positive across both
subjects.
Subject Matter
The coefficient on subject matter is negative and
statistically significant in both subjects using both models.
Woessman [15] also found a negative coefficient on this
variable for both math and science test scores, but his
findings were statistically insignificant. However, these
results are opposite of what was expected based on the
positive relationship between decentralization and student
achievement found in Vegas [21]. Although decentralization
in general may lead to increased student outcomes, it appears
that decentralizing the choice of subject matter to the teacher
level is negatively associated with educational efficiency.
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Textbook

4.2.1. Distribution of Responsibility

The coefficient estimates on the dummy for teachers
having a large influence on the choice of textbook are
statistically insignificant in both subjects using both models.
These estimates are positive in all but the OLS model in
science. Thus, the relationship between teachers influencing
textbook choice and school efficiency is unclear.

Responsibility for Hiring Teachers

Policy Implications: teachers should have a strong
influence over the kind of supplies used in the classroom, but
they should not have a strong influence over the subject
matter taught.
4.1.4. Country Specifics
The following are country-level variables thought to
impact efficiency in education. Some might question why
these variables are not placed in the first-stage production
function; however, because these are country-level variables,
they would be dropped from the school-level fixed effects
equation we use.
GDP Per Capita
The country's GDP per capita has negative and
statistically significant coefficients using both models in
math. In science, this coefficient estimate is positive using
OLS, but negative using fixed effects; neither of these
estimates are statistically significant. The result in math is
opposite of the positive and statistically significant
relationship between GDP per capita and test scores found in
Woessman [15]. It could be that students in countries with
higher standards of living (as measured by GDP per capita)
have less of an incentive to do well in school. This is likely
just an association, not a causal finding.
Expenditures Per Student
The variable measuring the level of expenditures per
student in a country has positive and statistically significant
coefficients in both subjects using both models. This is
similar to the finding in Millimet and Collier [25] of robust
efficiency spillovers across school districts in the same
county, only when the district operates in a financially
flexible environment
4.2. Sensitivity Analysis
To assess the sensitivity of our baseline results, we reconducted our analysis using two different sub-samples of
the data:
(i)

OECD Only: using only students from member
countries of the OECD; and

(ii)

CBEEE Only: using only students from countries that
have curriculum-based external exit exams
(CBEEEs).

The results of the analysis using only students from
member countries of the OECD are displayed in Tables 3
and 4. The results of the analysis using only students from
countries that have curriculum-based external exit exams
(CBEEEs) are displayed in Tables 5 and 6.

The sub-sample results show drastic changes in the
coefficient estimates on the dummies for schools and
teachers holding the responsibility for hiring teachers. When
we limit the sample to countries within the OECD, the OLS
estimates in both math and science on the dummy for
schools being responsible for hiring teachers switch signs
from the full sample results to negative coefficient estimates;
only the math result is statistically significant. The fixed
effect estimate in math on the dummy for schools being
responsible for hiring teachers is virtually indifferent
between the full sample and OECD sub-sample, but the
science estimate in the OECD sub-sample becomes negative
(but statistically insignificant), whereas it was positive in the
full sample.
The OLS and fixed effects coefficient estimates in
science on the dummy for teachers being responsible for
hiring teachers remain negative (as they were in the full
sample) in the OECD sub-sample, but also become
statistically significant. In math, this OLS estimate also
becomes statistically significant, but the fixed effect estimate
remains positive and statistically insignificant.
The coefficient estimates on the dummies for both
schools and teachers holding the responsibility for hiring
teachers are negative across both subjects and both models in
the CBEEE sub-sample, with the coefficient estimates on the
dummy for teacher responsibility holding statistical
significance. These changes in the coefficient estimates
between the full sample and the CBEEE sub-sample are
similar to the findings in Woessman [26] and Fuchs and
Woessman [20] that there is strong heterogeneity for the
effects of school autonomy.
Responsibility for Deciding School Budget
The coefficient estimates on the school dummy for
deciding school budget remains positive for the fixed effects
model in math and science across both sub-samples; and
gains statistical significance in the CBEEE sub-sample.
These estimates remain positive across all sub-samples in
both subjects for the OLS model except for the OECD subsample in math, which results in a negative, but statistically
insignificant coefficient estimate.
The coefficient estimates on the teacher dummy for
deciding school budget become larger and more positive in
both models with the CBEEE sub-sample for math and
science. On the contrary, these estimates become smaller or
more negative for the OECD sub-sample across both
subjects and models.
These results suggest that the relationships between
decentralized responsibility for deciding school budgets
(either at the school or teacher level) and both school
efficiency and student achievement are of a greater
magnitude for schools with CBEEEs.
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Translog Fixed Effects and OLS Production Function Estimates at the School Level with the Only Countries in the
OECD
Math

Independent

Science

OLS

Fixed Effects

OLS

Fixed Effects

Variable

Coeff

Std Error

Coeff

Std Error

Coeff

Std Error

Coeff

Std Error

Student's Age

6.711‡

1.797

6.744‡

1.074

6.239‡

1.665

5.130‡

1.241

Class Size

-1.675‡

0.306

0.053

0.272

-1.117‡

0.320

-0.529*

0.274

Teacher's Experience

-0.230

0.189

8.449‡

4.210

-0.241

0.164

-0.151

0.136

Student's Sex

-0.230*

0.123

0.069

0.093

-0.255†

0.122

-0.029

0.103

0.316

0.255

0.552‡

0.209

0.157

0.255

0.269

0.220

Live with both Parents

-0.930‡

0.192

0.127

0.151

-0.990‡

0.217

-0.308*

0.177

Both Parents born in Country

-0.522†

0.261

-0.332*

0.194

-0.322

0.268

-0.191

0.220

Parents' Education (University)

0.537

0.547

0.841†

0.425

0.334

0.700

0.752

0.633

Parents' Education 2 (Secondary)

0.048

0.203

-0.341†

0.151

-0.105

0.202

-0.124

0.175

Parents' Education 3 (Master’s)

0.123‡

0.046

0.025

0.026

0.120‡

0.032

0.056

0.028

Books in Home (1-10)

0.267

0.241

0.086

0.201

0.094

0.255

0.009

0.232

Books in Home (11-25)

-0.483‡

0.182

-0.315†

0.149

-0.187

0.200

-0.112

0.171

Books in Home (26-100)

-0.226

0.164

-0.098

0.127

-0.122

0.164

-0.014

0.136

Books in Home (101-200)

-0.130

0.167

0.042

0.124

-0.022

0.169

0.041

0.142

Teacher's Sex

0.445†

0.179

20.210†

10.037

-0.015

0.165

0.155

0.146

Teacher's Age 1

0.246*

0.142

-9.858†

5.012

0.217

0.138

0.209*

0.113

Teacher's Age 2

0.217

0.142

-9.846†

5.011

0.213

0.137

0.208*

0.113

Teacher's Age 3

0.190

0.142

-9.850†

5.011

0.218

0.136

0.215*

0.112

Teacher's Age 4

0.197

0.142

-9.854†

5.012

0.198

0.135

0.208*

0.112

Teacher's Age 5

0.202

0.143

-9.889†

5.012

0.215

0.136

0.181

0.113

Teacher's Education (Bachelor's)

-0.521

0.905

-

-

0.721

1.022

1.473†

0.741

Teacher's Education (Master's)

0.795‡

0.198

0.309*

0.160

0.564‡

0.192

0.028

0.162

Born in Country

Note: Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level. ‡ means significant at the 1% level; † means significant at the 5% level; * means significant at
the 10% level. OLS regression also includes all institutional arrangements and per capita GDP and expenditure per student.

Responsibility for Purchasing Supplies

Responsibility for Teacher Salaries

The coefficients on the school and teacher dummies for
purchasing supplies in math become insignificant in both
sub-samples using both models. Alternatively, the school
dummies for purchasing supplies in science are negative and
significant in the OECD sub-sample using both OLS and
fixed effects models. The coefficients on the teacher
dummies in science with the OECD sub-sample are also
negative for both models, but do not have statistical
significance. The coefficients on the teacher dummies in
science with the CBEEE sub-sample remain positive and
statistically significant in both models, as they were in the
full sample.

There are two changes in the coefficients on the school
and teacher dummies for deciding teacher salaries using the
sub-samples. First, the CBEEE sub-sample estimate in math
on the teacher dummy is positive and statistically significant
in both models, whereas these coefficients were negative and
statistically insignificant using the full sample. Second, the
OECD sub-sample estimate in science on the teacher
dummy is negative and statistically significant in both
models, whereas these coefficients were negative and
statistically insignificant using the full sample. Again, there
appears to be unknown factors present in OECD countries
that are not present in the other countries in the full sample
that are impacting our results. Additionally, the presence of
CBEEEs seems to alter the relationships between
institutional arrangements and student achievement and
school efficiency. This is further evidence of the finding in
Woessman [26] of strong heterogeneity for the effects of
school autonomy.

This suggests that the optimal level of responsibility for
purchasing supplies is highly dependent on other factors,
including the subject and the presence of CBEEEs. There
also appears to be some unknown factors present in OECD
countries that are not present in the other countries included
in the full sample that impact the relationship between the
responsibility for purchasing supplies and both student
achievement and school efficiency.

Policy Implications: teachers in OECD countries should
not be responsible for hiring science teachers or for
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Translog Fixed Effects and OLS Production Function Estimates at the School Level with the Only Countries that have
CBEEEs
Math

Independent

Science

OLS

Fixed Effects

OLS

Fixed Effects

Variable

Coeff

Std Error

Coeff

Std Error

Coeff

Std Error

Coeff

Std Error

Student's Age

8.606‡

1.767

5.761‡

1.062

7.326‡

1.840

4.867‡

1.230

Class Size

-1.475‡

0.325

-0.601‡

0.208

-1.221‡

0.365

-0.391

0.283

Teacher's Experience

-0.322

0.226

0.117

0.145

-0.503‡

0.182

-0.132

0.132

Student's Sex

-0.317†

0.130

0.002

0.097

-0.163

0.136

0.040

0.109

0.242

0.315

0.328

0.204

0.314

0.262

0.210

0.222

Live with both Parents

-0.847‡

0.206

-0.157

0.158

-0.966‡

0.240

-0.414†

0.186

Both Parents born in Country

-0.940‡

0.292

-0.514‡

0.194

-0.895‡

0.275

-0.296

0.220

Parents' Education (University)

0.502

0.647

0.430

0.530

1.399

0.860

0.632

0.654

Parents' Education 2 (Secondary)

0.258

0.235

-0.420†

0.174

0.497*

0.265

0.028

0.200

Parents' Education 3 (Master’s)

0.086‡

0.032

0.010

0.023

0.112‡

0.033

0.048*

0.026

Books in Home (1-10)

0.132

0.277

0.368

0.227

-0.347

0.302

-0.109

0.265

Books in Home (11-25)

-0.278

0.225

-0.358†

0.175

0.047

0.230

0.011

0.191

Books in Home (26-100)

-0.157

0.174

-0.031

0.128

0.107

0.182

-0.002

0.141

Books in Home (101-200)

-0.165

0.165

0.158

0.123

-0.045

0.175

0.130

0.139

Teacher's Sex

0.590‡

0.228

0.469‡

0.155

0.162

0.207

0.353†

0.151

Teacher's Age 1

0.436†

0.180

-0.038

0.116

0.585‡

0.161

0.165

0.111

Teacher's Age 2

0.410†

0.181

-0.021

0.117

0.566‡

0.158

0.165

0.110

Teacher's Age 3

0.376†

0.181

-0.020

0.120

0.567‡

0.158

0.174

0.109

Teacher's Age 4

0.383†

0.181

-0.044

0.125

0.549‡

0.157

0.173

0.109

Teacher's Age 5

0.385†

0.182

-0.061

0.128

0.548‡

0.158

0.138

0.111

Teacher's Education (Bachelor's)

0.375

0.803

-0.629

0.506

-1.035

0.823

-0.735

0.694

Teacher's Education (Master's)

0.723‡

0.221

0.475‡

0.158

0.542†

0.236

0.017

0.177

Born in Country

Note: Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level. ‡ means significant at the 1% level; † means significant at the 5% level; * means significant at the 10% level. OLS
regression also includes all institutional arrangements and per capita GDP and expenditure per student.

determining science teacher salaries. Similarly, teachers
should not be responsible for hiring science or math teachers
when CBEEs are present. School administrators should be
responsible for deciding school budgets and determining
teachers’ salaries when CBEEs are present. However, the
responsibility for purchasing science supplies should not be
held by school administrators in OECD countries.
4.2.2. Influences on Curriculum
External Exams
The coefficients on external exams remain negative
across both models and both sub-samples in math, but the
only statistically significant estimate in the sub-samples
using math scores occurs with the OLS model in the OECD
sub-sample. The coefficient estimates on this variable in
science are actually positive and statistically significant for
the CBEEE sub-sample across both models; while these
estimates are statistically insignificant for the OECD subsample across both models. This suggests that the
relationship between external exams and student
achievement and school efficiency are different for countries

with and without curriculum based external exit exams and
across subjects.
Teachers Individually
There are no changes in the signs of the coefficient
estimates on the dummy variable for teachers individually
influencing curriculum across the OECD and CBEEE subsamples. This suggests that allowing teachers greater control
over the curriculum is beneficial to students in OECD and
non-OECD countries and in countries with and without
CBEEEs.
Subject Teachers
There is only one change in the signs of the coefficient
estimates on the dummy variable for subject teachers
influencing curriculum across the OECD and CBEEE subsamples. The coefficient estimate on subject teachers in
science using the fixed effects model with the OECD subsample is negative, but statistically insignificant. This tells us
that the positive relationship found in the full sample is fairly
robust to sample selection.
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The Determinants of Efficiency at the School Level (Translog Model) using OLS and Fixed Effects in OECD Countries
Math

Independent
Variable

Science

OLS

Fixed Effects

OLS

Fixed Effects

Coeff

Std Error

Coeff

Std Error

Coeff

Std Error

Coeff

Std Error

Schools

-0.012†

0.005

0.002

0.002

-0.003

0.005

-0.001

0.004

Teachers

-0.104‡

0.014

0.001

0.002

-0.074‡

0.026

-0.050*

0.028

Schools

-0.006

0.008

0.001

0.001

0.005

0.009

0.002

0.006

Teachers

0.007

0.014

-3.72E-04

0.001

-0.016

0.017

-0.006

0.014

Schools

-0.011

0.011

-1.65E-04

4.46E-04

-0.031‡

0.009

-0.023‡

0.008

Teachers

-2.84E-04

0.011

3.93E-05

4.27E-04

-0.011

0.010

-0.002

0.009

Schools

0.010†

0.004

-0.002

0.002

0.006

0.004

0.007†

0.003

Teachers

-0.040

0.030

-0.002

0.002

-0.054†

0.023

-0.060‡

0.022

External Exams

-0.017‡

0.005

1.14E-04

1.60E-04

0.003

0.005

-0.001

0.004

Teachers Individually

0.011†

0.004

0.003

0.003

0.007*

0.004

0.005

0.003

Subject Teachers

0.020‡

0.005

-0.001

0.001

0.024

0.005

0.021‡

0.004

Teachers Collectively

-0.011†

0.005

-0.001

0.001

-0.009†

0.004

-0.012‡

0.004

Teachers' Unions

-0.043

0.032

-0.001

0.002

-0.070‡

0.026

-0.064‡

0.021

Money for Supplies

-0.022†

0.010

-0.004

0.004

-0.003

0.006

0.000

0.007

Kind of Supplies

0.016‡

0.005

0.004

0.004

0.010†

0.004

0.009†

0.004

Subject Matter

-0.001

0.005

0.002

0.002

-0.008†

0.004

-0.005

0.004

Textbook

0.014‡

0.005

-0.002

0.002

0.015‡

0.004

0.013‡

0.004

GDP per capita

-8.12E-06‡

6.62E-07

-6.91E-08

6.98E-08

-4.56E-06‡

7.01E-07

-9.01E-07‡

5.07E-07

Expenditure per student

2.81E-05‡

2.33E-06

-1.04E-07

1.16E-07

1.33E-05‡

2.32E-06

-1.41E-07

1.66E-06

Responsible for:
Hiring Teachers

Deciding School Budget

Purchasing Supplies

Determining Teacher's Salaries

Influences Curriculum

Teachers have a large Influence on:

Note: Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level. ‡ means significant at the 1% level; † means significant at the 5% level; * means significant at the 10% level. OLS
regressions also included the background variables in Table 3.

Teachers Collectively
The coefficients on the dummy for teachers collectively
remain negative across all estimates using the sub-samples.
These coefficients actually gain statistical significance in the
OECD sub-sample with both models in science and for the
OLS model only in math. Only the fixed effects estimate in
math holds statistical significance in the CBEEE sub-sample.
It appears that the relationships between allowing teachers to
collectively influence the curriculum and student
achievement and school efficiency are of different
magnitudes across different samples of countries.
Teachers’ Unions
The coefficient estimates on teachers' unions remain
negative across both sub-samples using both models in math

and science. These estimates are also statistically significant
in all but the OECD sub-sample estimates in math. Thus,
teachers' unions not only have a very strong relationship with
school efficiency, relative to the other institutional factors,
but also maintain this strong relationship across different
sub-samples of countries.
Policy Implications: neither teachers collectively nor
teachers’ unions should have a strong influence over science
curriculum in OECD countries. Similarly, teachers’ unions
should not have a strong influence over math or science
curriculum when CBEEs are present. Alternatively,
individual teachers should have a strong influence over
curriculum when CBEEs are present. Lastly, subject teachers
and external exams should have a strong influence over
science curriculum when CBEEs are present.
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The Determinants of Efficiency at the School Level (Translog Model) Using OLS and Fixed Effects in Countries with
CBEEEs
Math

Independent
Variable

OLS

Science
Fixed Effects

OLS

Fixed Effects

Coeff

Std Error

Coeff

Std Error

Coeff

Std Error

Coeff

Std Error

Schools

-0.007

0.007

-0.010†

0.004

-0.001

0.007

-0.005

0.005

Teachers

-0.100‡

0.011

-0.096‡

0.006

-0.066‡

0.013

-0.082‡

0.007

Schools

0.034‡

0.009

0.014‡

0.006

0.027†

0.011

0.019‡

0.007

Teachers

0.065‡

0.016

0.052‡

0.010

0.025

0.019

0.036‡

0.014

Schools

0.008

0.018

0.002

0.011

0.033

0.023

0.018

0.013

Teachers

0.028

0.019

0.014

0.011

0.058†

0.023

0.040‡

0.014

Schools

0.018‡

0.004

0.015‡

0.003

0.014‡

0.004

0.014‡

0.003

Teachers

0.040‡

0.015

0.030‡

0.010

0.016

0.014

0.012

0.011

External Exams

-0.001

0.006

-0.004

0.004

0.015‡

0.005

0.008†

0.004

Teachers Individually

0.024‡

0.005

0.018‡

0.004

0.017‡

0.005

0.013‡

0.004

Subject Teachers

0.005

0.006

0.003

0.004

0.013†

0.006

0.013‡

0.004

Teachers Collectively

-0.004

0.006

-0.006*

0.004

-0.006

0.005

-0.006

0.004

Teachers' Unions

-0.049*

0.026

-0.038†

0.018

-0.075‡

0.023

-0.068‡

0.019

Money for Supplies

-0.006

0.011

-0.004

0.008

0.007

0.007

0.011

0.008

Kind of Supplies

0.015†

0.007

0.009†

0.005

0.006

0.005

0.004

0.005

Subject Matter

-0.006

0.005

0.001

0.004

-0.004

0.004

-0.003

0.004

Textbook

-4.56E-04

0.006

-0.003

0.004

0.002

0.005

0.003

0.005

GDP per capita

-1.00E-06

1.01E-06

7.02E-07

6.34E-07

-1.37E-06

1.04E-06

5.71E-07

7.76E-07

Expenditure per student

1.66E-06

3.96E-06

-3.23E-06

2.45E-06

1.03E-06

3.90E-06

-5.58E-06*

2.91E-06

Responsible for:
Hiring Teachers

Deciding School Budget

Purchasing Supplies

Determining Teacher's Salaries

Influences Curriculum

Teachers have a large Influence on:

Note: Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level. ‡ means significant at the 1% level; † means significant at the 5% level; * means significant at the 10% level. OLS
regressions also included the background variables in Table 4.

4.2.3. Teacher Influence

Kind of Supplies

Money for Supplies

The sub-sample coefficient estimates on the dummy
variable for teachers holding a large influence on the kind of
supplies are largely unchanged from their full sample
counterparts. All of these estimates remain positive,
however, the CBEEE estimates in science are statistically
insignificant. This suggests that our full sample finding is
mostly robust to sample selection, although the estimate is
less precise for the CBEEE sub-sample in science.

The coefficients on the dummy variable indicating that
class teachers have a large influence on money for supplies
remain negative for all of the sub-sample estimates in math.
However, the CBEEE estimates in science are positive using
both models and the OECD estimate in math using the fixed
effects model in science in positive. Although these
estimates do change signs from the full sample to the subsamples in science, none of these estimates are statistically
significant. It appears that the effect of giving teachers a
large influence over money for supplies is largely dependent
on subject, whether or not the country has curriculum based
external exit exams and other unobservable factors in OECD
countries.

Subject Matter
The coefficient estimates on subject matter are mostly
negative in the sub-sample models; however, they lack the
statistical significance that was present in the full sample.
Thus, it may be that the presence of curriculum based
external exit exams and unobservable factors in OECD

The Impact of Institutional Arrangements on Educational Efficiency

countries diminish the impact of teachers holding influence
over subject matter.
Textbook
The coefficient estimates on the dummy for teachers
having a large influence on the choice of textbook are
positive and statistically significant in the OECD sub-sample
models using OLS for both subjects and using fixed effects
in science. Both models result in positive coefficients with
the CBEEE sub-sample for science, but negative coefficients
for this sub-sample in math. It appears that the effects of
giving teachers a large influence over the textbook is largely
dependent on subject, whether or not the country has
curriculum based external exit exams and other unobservable
factors in OECD countries.
Policy Implications: teachers should have a large
influence over the kind of supplies and textbook used in
science classes in OECD countries.
4.2.4. Country Specifics
GDP Per Capita
The coefficient estimate on a country’s GDP per capita in
science is negative and statistically significant using both
models for the OECD sub-sample. This result could be due
to the fact that OECD countries have higher GDP per capita
in general, but clearly does not indicate that countries should
try to lower their GDP per capita in an attempt to increase
academic success. The remaining sub-sample estimates for
GDP per capita are largely statistically insignificant and
mostly uninteresting.
Expenditures Per Student
The variable measuring the level of expenditures per
student in a country has negative coefficients in all of the
sub-sample estimates using the fixed effects model;
including the CBEEE sub-sample estimate in science, which
is statistically significant. This is in contrast to the positive
and statistically significant findings for the full sample. The
OLS sub-sample results are all positive, while the fixed
effects sub-sample results are all negative. Thus, it could be
that more spending on education is beneficial to student
achievement, but that this spending is often inefficient. This
also shows that there may be unobservable factors in OECD
countries and other important characteristics of some
countries (e.g. the presence CBEEEs) that play an important
role in educational production function modeling.
CONCLUSION
Increased student achievement has been linked to
increased economic growth, and thus has become a primary
objective for most developed countries. Unfortunately,
researchers have found scant evidence of factors within the
control of policymakers that can increase student
achievement. In fact, significant increases in per pupil
expenditures in the United States over recent decades have
not lead to any discernible increases in student test scores
over the same period. Following the work of Woessman [15]
and Collier and Millimet [9], this paper seeks to further our
knowledge of the effects of institutional characteristics that
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may not vary within the United States. The TIMSS 1999
dataset (a compilation of over 120,000 students from 28
countries) is analyzed to determine whether an indirect
relationship exists between institutional arrangements and
student test scores, via a relationship with educational
efficiency.
This paper uses two different educational models; one,
ordinary least squares, includes the institutional
characteristics as variables that directly influence student
achievement; the other, a fixed effects model, first estimates
the level of efficiency in each school then estimates the
relationship between the institutional characteristics and
school efficiency. Differences in the coefficient estimates of
institutional characteristics between the two models are
minimal, but do exist. The coefficients on: schools holding
the responsibility for hiring teachers and determining
teachers’ salaries, and teachers holding a large influence on
money for supplies are all statistically significant in the fixed
effects model, but not so in the OLS model for both math
and science. The opposite, statistical significance in the OLS
model, is true of teachers individually influencing the
curriculum in both math and science. In none of these
instances do the signs of the coefficients differ and hold
statistical significance. Thus, differences do result from
using the two models, but it is not clear which model is
necessarily preferred. This analysis does provide robust
estimates for some institutional arrangements with consistent
coefficient estimates across both models in both subjects.
Our results suggest that: both teachers and schools holding
the responsibility for purchasing supplies, subject teachers
holding a strong influence over the curriculum and teachers
having a strong influence over the kind of supplies used in
the classroom are all positively associated with student
achievement and school efficiency. Teachers’ unions and
teachers holding a strong influence over the subject matter
are both negatively associated with student achievement and
school efficiency.
Our specification analysis using sub-samples of the full
data suggest that there are important differences in OECD
and non-OECD countries that are not attributable to
observable
institutional
arrangements.
Additionally,
curriculum-based external exit exams (CBEEEs) appear to
have an important impact not only on student achievement,
but also on the relationship between institutional
arrangements and student achievement. Similar to
Woessman [26], we find differing relationships between
some of our institutional arrangements and school efficiency
(as well as student achievement) between countries with and
without CBEEEs.
Despite the differences between our approach and
Woessman’s [15] approach, it is clear that institutional
arrangements are significantly related to educational
production. Consistent findings across Woessman [15],
Collier and Millimet [9], and the current paper include:
school autonomy in purchasing supplies has a positive
relationship with student achievement and efficiency; and
teachers' unions having a large influence on curriculum is
associated with lower levels of student achievement and
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school efficiency. In fact, this paper finds that a large
influence on curriculum by teachers' unions has a stronger
negative association on school efficiency than any of the
other institutional arrangements analyzed in this paper.
Future research to determine the exact relationship between
institutional arrangements and student achievement could
provide more concrete answers for the contradictory
evidence across the three studies mentioned above.
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